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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Corporations-Pension Plans Involving Spoliation of Corporate Assets
- The Board of Directors of the American Woolen Company approved
a "retirement income plan" for the salaried employees of the corpora-
tion. The plan was to be put into effect January 1, 1948, and fixed the
retirement age at sixty five. The amount each employee would receive
was to be determined by a percentage formula, which took into account
the employee's salary and length of service, both prior and subsequent
to the operative date of the plan. A Mr. Pendleton had been president
of the corporation for thirty years and, under this plan, would be sixty
five years of age in another year and eligible for an annual pension for
life of $54,220. The company proposed to pay $4,657,292 into a trust
fund to cover the past services of employees. In the face of the fact
that the company had borrowed $10,000,000 during the preceding year
plaintiff, a minority stockholder, sought an injunction against the cor-
poration and its directors, alleging that such a pension was "excessive"
and "unconscionable," and questioning the proper motives of the di-
rectors. The District Court entered summary judgment for the defen-
dant on motion and affidavits. Held: reversed. Whether the plan
amounted to a spoliation or waste of corporate property or was made in
the proper exercise of director judgment was a question for trial.
Fogelson v. American Woolen Co., 170 F. (2d) 660 (C.C.A. 2d 1949).
This case marks another milestone in a controversial field of cor-
porate law. In the last quarter century large American corporations
have been increasingly cognizant of wider responsibilities than were
involved in the traditional single concern for maximum profits for
shareholders. Forty years ago it was uncommon for corporate manage-
ment to make any sizeable contribution to charitable and similar organi-
zations. To-day such gifts are more the rule than the exception, and
the practice bears close relation to tax considerations. The courts, per-
haps mindful of corporate social responsibility, have followed the trend
and allowed management wider latitude.1 The courts tend to sustain a
corporate decision, and are reluctant to interfere in the ordinary case.
In general management has been reasonable in these matters, and has
cess. There statutory regulations exist, but such regulations are enacted for
the benefit and protection of those financially interested in the corporation
and not for the protection of the state."
"The passing interest of the state in their continuance is well illustrated by
the fact that a dissolution of the corporation automatically follows upon its
failure to file certain reports in the office of the secretary of state. If the
corporation were an institution in which the state had a special interest, its
life would not be so summarily snuffed out for its mere failure to report the
names and addresses of its officers to a public official."
1 McQuillen v. Nat. Cash Register Co., 112 F.(2d) 887 (C.C.A. 4th 1940), cert.
denied, 311 U.S. 695 (1940). Cited in 170 F.(2d) 660, 662:
"Courts are properly reluctant to interfere with business judgment of
corporate directors; they do so only if there has been a clear abuse of dis-
cretion as to amount to legal waste."
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not been shackled by many harsh cases which would have arrested such
a line of development at its inception. But the question always remains:
when will judicial scrutiny of a decision by directors or majority stock-
holders lead to a judgment for damages, or an injunction?
Obviously a primary purpose of corporate organization is to pro-
vide the highest possible dollar return to the investor.2 But once a
business organization becomes a "going concern," it takes its place in
the nation, in a community, alongside other human organizations; and
it is in this latter aspect that it develops a wider, social significance. It
is now settled that management may aid charitable organizations,3 and
provide an infinite number of services for its employees and outsiders.
In the long run these plans may or may not yield a profit, and in few
cases will the pecuniary advantage be immediate. All this means an
immediate sacrifice in dollars and cents to the stockholder, and yet the
courts sustain such practices.4 The adjudicated cases have not been
numerous enough to provide answers in many situations.5 While the
courts have been reluctant to interfere, they have done so in a number
of cases, most of which hold that such proposals raise questions of fact
for trial.
Probably the leading case is Rogers v. Hill.6 In deciding an action
by minority stockholders to enjoin a bonus program for certain execu-
tives the Court said:
"We have long since passed the stage in which stockholders, who
merely invest capital and leave it wholly to management to make
it fruitful, can make absolutely exclusive claim to all profits
against those whose labor, skill, ability, judgment, and effort
have made profits available. The reward, however, must have
reasonable relation to the value of the services for which it is
given and must not be, in whole or in part, a misuse or waste of
corporate funds, or a gift to a favored few, or a scheme to dis-
tribute profits under a mere guise of compensation, but in fact
having no relation to services rendered."
7
2 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 507, 170 N.W. 668 (1919).
The author points up this problem at p .1162,
"A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the
profit of the stockholders," and directors cannot lawfully "conduct the af-
fairs of a corporation for the merely incidental benefit of shareholders and
for the primary purpose of benefitting others."
3 State ex rel Sorenson v. Chicago B. & Q. R. R., 112 Neb. 248, 119 N.W.
534 (1924).
4 For whom are corporate managers trustees?, 45 HARV. L. R-v. 1145, 1162
(1932).
"Business-which is the economic organization of society-is private prop-
erty only in a qualified sense and society may properly demand that it be
carried on in such a way as to safeguard the interests of those who deal
with it either as employees or consumers even if the proprietary rights of
its owners are thereby curtailed."
5For the general subject of a bonus for employees, see 40 A.L.R. 1423; 88
A.L.R. 751.
6289 U.S. 582 (1933).
7 289 U.S. 582, 590.
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This language is frequently quoted by writers on the subject. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court used substantially this same standard in
Thauer v. Gaebler,8 decided a few yeare before Rogers v. Hill. This
was a derivative action by minority stockholders to recover a bonus of
$500 to an officer for services performed during a preceding year, and
to enjoin an increase in salary voted by the board of directors for two
of its officers. The Court stated:
"There must be a clear abuse of discretion, fraud, or bad faith,
resulting in spoliation of minority stockholders and ruin to the
corporation."9
It is implicit in the case that on any strong appeal for relief the
court might hold director action to be an abuse of discretion as a matter
of law. It should be further noted that this whole question is a matter
regulated by decisional law. The writer could find no statute applicable
to the situation in the instant case.
FREDERICiK A. MILLER
Taxation-Family Partnerships- Upon the dissolution of the
Coon-Culbertson cattle raising partnership taxpayer Culbertson bought
up the basic stock with the understanding that his sons be taken into
the new business. A new partnership was formed by Culbertson and
his four sons. The sons' contributed share of the capital was repre-
sented by their note, payment of which was made partly with funds
received as a gift from the taxpayer and partly by proceeds of a loan
procured from the new partnership. The oldest son rendered some
service, although not vital in nature, to the conduct of the partnership
before being called to army service. The other sons rendered no service
because of either college or army demands for their time, although
it was their intention eventually to become active in the business. The
taxpayer distributed the profits according to the partnership agreement
and included only his distributive share in his federal income tax re-
turn. The Tax Court included the entire partnership income in the
father's return, holding that the sons did not contribute "vital services"
or "original capital" and insisting that these objective tests must be
met to establish the existence of a partnership for tax purposes., The
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on a finding of intention to form a
partnership and to render future service to it.2 Held: reversed. Both
courts handed down decisions based on falacious interpretation of es-
tablished precedent. The case was remanded to the Tax Court for re-
8202 Wis. 296, 232, N.W. 561 (1930); noted in 1939 Wis. L. REv. 221; 164
A.L.R. 1133; 175 A.L.R. 594.
9 202 Wis. 296, 302, 232 N.W. 561, 564 (1930).
1 1 47,168 P-H MEMO T.C. (1947).
2168 F(2d) 980 (1948).
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